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SUMMARY 
This study assesses the performance of supply chains for two major export crops 
produced in Nepal (ginger and large cardamom) from a smallholder perspective. It 
aims to identify factors that constrain marketing choices available to smallholders, 
limiting the chain’s robustness from their perspective. A qualitative case study 
method was used to gather and analyse data on farmer-buyer dyads in the ginger and 
cardamom chains. These case studies were informed by a conceptual model based on 
Transaction Cost Economics. The analysis included a cross-case comparison to 
identify the effects of exogenous chain attributes on the channels available to 
smallholders. Informal market trading was the only form of smallholder engagement 
observed in both chains. However, there was evidence that smallholders had 
previously engaged in relational contracts in the ginger chain, and in ‘captive’ 
relational contracts in the cardamom chain. There was no evidence that smallholders 
had ever engaged in either spot markets or conventional contracts in these chains. 
Although the informal market channel continues to operate, the ginger and 
cardamom chains are not robust from a smallholder perspective as producers are 
unable to select channels that better match their risk-reward preferences. The 
analysis suggests that access to other channels is constrained mainly by under-
investment in value-adding assets. Government should give more attention to the 
cooperative model that it supports to promote collective marketing. Traditional 
cooperatives can and do help to resolve problems of asymmetric information and 
high unit transaction costs, but more innovative cooperative models are required to 
encourage the investment needed to finance value-adding assets and activities. 
 
Key words: Large cardamom, ginger, transaction cost, collective marketing, case 
study  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Linkages between producers and markets are becoming increasingly coordinated to 
meet growing demands for high quality, safe food (Reardon, Timmer, & Berdegue, 
2005; Shepherd, 2007; Woods, 2004). However, such shifts are seldom beneficial to 
smallholders who struggle to meet the costs imposed by these demands (Markelova 
et al., 2009; Pingali et al., 2005; Poulton et al., 2006; Shepherd, 2007; Vorley et al., 
2009). This is cause for concern as agriculture remains a major source of livelihood 
for most of the rural poor in developing countries (World Bank, 2007), and linking 
them to markets will be crucial in sustaining their livelihoods and promoting both 
rural and urban food security (Wheatley and Peters, 2004). It is therefore important 
to identify ways of maintaining and promoting smallholder engagement in food 
supply chains. 
  
Literature relating to chain performance tends to focus on whole chain issues and 
seldom considers performance from a smallholder perspective (Aramyan et al., 2006; 
Cadilhon et al., 2006; Chan and Qi, 2003; Gunasekaran et al., 2004; Lohman et al., 
2004). This study takes a smallholder view and explores the ability of supply chains 
to sustain smallholder engagement. It focuses on the dyad between growers and their 
immediate buyers, and applies the axiom that a chain is robust if it has one or more 
dyads that sustain smallholder engagement. A chain that offers smallholders a range 
of such dyads, each with its own risk-reward profile, is considered to be more robust 
than one that offers smallholders few marketing choices. 
  
The paper draws on a conceptual model based on Transaction Cost Economics 
(Williamson, 1979, 1985) to analyse information gathered in case studies of supply 
chains for ginger and large cardamom in Nepal, focussing on producer-buyer dyads. 
The model, developed by Bhattarai et al. (2013), extends the traditional vertical 
coordination continuum to incorporate missing dyads and informal market 
transactions. The purpose of this study is to understand why certain dyads are (or are 
not) used by smallholders in order to identify effective ways of improving their 
access to markets. 
 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
Bhattarai et al.’s (2013) conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 1. The segments of 
the ‘dyadic pie’ represent different modes of producer-buyer engagement in the 
vertical coordination continuum. The model distinguishes between informal markets 
and spot markets. Spot markets tend to be characterised by rigorous trading rules and 
product standards that support frequent and impersonal transactions based on prices. 
Informal markets, on the other hand, lack rules and standards. Transactions 
conducted in these markets tend to be personalised and cash-based to mitigate 
behavioural risk. Transactions in the conventional contracting dyad usually involve 
relatively simple terms that can be expressed in writing and enforced by a court of 
law. Relational contracts involve complex, recurring transactions with implicit terms 
that require internal enforcement. Vertical integration shifts coordination decisions 
and their enforcement to managers. 
 
Anticlockwise shifts from one segment to the next are driven by the frequency and 
complexity of transactions, asset-specific investment and hold-up problems 
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associated with behavioural and environmental risk. Transaction costs are expected 
to increase with increases in the levels of these drivers, motivating tighter 
coordination between sellers and buyers. At some point vertical coordination gives 
way to vertical integration, which may well collapse if environmental risks are too 
high (Truong, 2012). The conceptual model applies to individual agents in a chain, 
and a chain is therefore expected to host a variety of dyadic relationships as 
transaction costs vary between individuals and locations. A chain in which 
smallholders continue to engage with buyers via multiple dyads suggests that they 
are able to exercise utility-improving choices. Conversely, a chain that does not 
engage smallholders in multiple dyads may well signal limited choice and hence 
scope for prudent interventions to promote smallholder participation.  
 
Figure 1: Modes of engagement between farmers and buyers  
 
Source: Bhattarai et al. (2013).  
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
A qualitative, case study research strategy was adopted as the intention was to 
generalise the findings of the study to propositions rather than to a population, and 
the propositions address ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about smallholder participation 
in supply chains rather than questions relating to ‘how many’ (Yin, 2009, pp. 1-24). 
Selection of the supply chains for case study was therefore purposive to ensure both 
theoretical and literal replication of the conceptual model’s propositions. In each 
case, the unit of analysis was the farmer-buyer dyad. Producers and buyers, including 
potential buyers, were treated as sub-units in the embedded, multiple-case design. 
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Data were gathered by the first author from May to June 2011 in personal, semi-
structured interviews conducted with farmers, managers of marketing cooperatives, 
buyers, potential buyers, government extension officers and staff working for 
NGO’s. Further details about the study sites and respondents are provided in the 
overview of the ginger and cardamom chains presented in the next section.  
Interviews were recorded and later transcribed and coded using NVivo software to 
facilitate data retrieval and analysis. The analysis followed the approach suggested 
by Yin (2009, pp. 136-144) of searching for patterns in the data and comparing or 
contrasting observed patterns with those predicted by theory. In this way, theoretical 
propositions (such as those summarised by the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 
1) can be confirmed or rejected. If rejected, the data may suggest alternative 
propositions, shifting the focus of the analysis to ‘theory building’. The ginger and 
cardamom chains were analysed separately, followed by a cross-case comparison 
aimed at isolating the effects of exogenous attributes on the observed dyads.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAINS 
 
Ginger and cardamom are Nepal’s second and fourth most important agricultural 
export crops respectively (Trade and Enterprise Promotion Centre, undated). 
Virtually all (98%) of the exported ginger and cardamom goes to India (Trade and 
Enterprise Promotion Centre, undated). This section provides a brief overview of the 
chains studied. The aim is not to provide comprehensive information about these 
chains but to understand the nature of relationships between producers and their 
buyers. The terms ‘producers’ and ‘buyers’ refer only to case study respondents. 
  
Ginger 
 
The case study was conducted in the Palpa district, a major ginger producing district 
along with Ilam, Salyan and Nawalparasi districts. Palpa lies in the mid-hills of 
western Nepal and is connected by all-weather roads to Butwal in the southern plain 
and the resort town of Pokhara in the North. Another all-weather road links Palpa 
with the interior district of Gulmi in the west. This road passes through Bhairabsthan 
village, the case study site. The case study comprises interviews with five farmers, 
the manager of the Bhairab Ginger Producers’ Cooperative, two executives of the 
district federal cooperative, three traders (including a potential buyer) and three 
officials of government and non-government agencies. Ginger production in Palpa 
intensified in the early 2000s when an NGO implemented a donor funded project in 
the district. The producer cooperative was established in 2004 with 109 small ginger 
growers, and operates a collection depot in Bhairabsthan village. Volumes sold 
increased from 15 to 77 tons between 2004 and 2011. 
  
Figure 2 illustrates existing market channels (solid arrows), discontinued channels 
(dashed arrows with dots) and potential channels (dashed arrows). Table 1 
summarises the characteristics of observed and recent channels. In previous years, 
the producer cooperative sold both fresh ginger and processed (dried and sliced) 
ginger. However, at the time of the study, only fresh ginger was still being sold 
(channel 3b in Figure 2). Channel 4 in Figure 2 represents a potential marketing 
channel for dried ginger that failed to materialise when negotiations between the 
cooperative and Exporter 2 broke down. Channel 5 also refers to a potential 
marketing channel that failed to materialise when talks between a federal cooperative 
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and a local noodle factory failed to produce a trading relationship. These potential 
channels (Channels 4 and 5) were omitted from Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ginger supply chain  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of observed farmer-buyer ginger dyads 
Dyad 
characteristics 
Local trader 
dyad (1) 
Federal Cooperative 
dyad (2) 
Exporter 1 
 dyad (3a) 
Wholesale trader 
dyad (3b) 
Contract Verbal Written Written Verbal 
Contract with Producer Federal Cooperative Producer Cooperative Producer Cooperative 
Product  Fresh Fresh Sliced and dried Fresh 
Price  Prevailing market price 
Negotiated price 
valid for a week 
Fixed price negotiated 
for a year  
Negotiated for each 
transaction  
Payment At the time of transaction 
Part advance and 
final payments 
settled monthly 
Part advance and full 
payment on delivery 
Part advance and 
full payment before 
dispatch 
Extension advice 
from buyer No No No No 
Finance by buyer No No No No 
Asset specific 
investment by the 
seller 
None 
In building and 
equipment through 
grant funding 
In building and 
equipment through 
grant funding 
In building and 
equipment through 
grant funding 
Asset specific 
investment by the 
buyer 
None None 
Investment in organic 
certification, drying 
equipment 
None 
Information 
exchange None Price, volume 
Quality requirement, 
delivery schedule 
Price and quantity 
during negotiation 
Next buyer Wholesalers Indian traders Importers in US and Austria Indian traders 
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Large cardamom 
 
This case study was conducted in Ilam district in eastern Nepal, a major cardamom 
producing district bordering India. An all-weather road from the southern plains 
passes through Ilam, and another main road connects Phikal - a major cardamom 
trading hub in southern Ilam - to India. The case study included interviews with six 
farmers, three immediate buyers and four key informants working for government 
and non-government agencies involved in large cardamom promotion. There was no 
evidence of collective marketing in the cardamom chain. The solid arrows in Figure 
3 show how farmers in the study chain are linked to the market. Dotted arrows 
indicate potential export links directly to countries other than India. 
    
 
Figure 3: Large cardamom supply chain  
 
Small cardamom growers sell to district traders based in market centres along the 
highway. They also sell to exporters in Birtamod (a major cardamom trading hub in 
the southern plains) and village traders. Nepalese exporters sell to traders based in 
various Indian cities. However, all three dyads exhibited very similar relationship 
characteristics (Table 2). 
  
Farmers and traders used to engage in a practice known as Dahadani. In terms of this 
practice, forward purchase was negotiated at an agreed price or a promise to buy at a 
prevailing market price, and buyers would advance cash or foodstuffs to farmers on 
credit. However, this practice no longer exists and buyers no longer finance 
producers. Farmers believed that Dahadani exposed them to opportunistic pricing, 
both in selling cardamom and in purchasing foodstuffs from the buyers. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of observed farmer-buyer cardamom dyads 
Characteristics 
Exporter dyad  
District trader dyad  
Village trader dyad 
Contract Verbal 
Contract with Individual 
Price  Negotiated for each transaction  
Payment At the time of transaction
Extension advice from buyer No 
Finance by buyer No 
Asset specific investment by producers Low for most farmers but high for those who grow cardamom in their arable lands  
Asset specific investment by the buyer Limited in processing by exporters, none by other buyers 
Information exchange Price and quantity at the time of negotiation 
Next buyer Indian traders for exporters, Exporters for district traders District traders and exporters for village traders 
 
 
CHAIN ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Ginger 
  
Dyadic relationships in the ginger chain switched from informal market transactions 
to relational contracts and back to informal market transactions. There was no 
evidence of spot market trading or conventional contracting. Transactions with 
Exporter 2 did not materialise even though the product met the importer’s 
requirements. Similarly, transactions with a noodle factory did not materialise 
despite the efforts of a federal cooperative to engage this buyer. Figure 4 relates the 
observed and failed dyads to modes of engagement proposed by the conceptual 
model. 
 
 
Figure 4: Observed and failed modes of engagement and their drivers  
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Prior to the donor-funded project in the early 2000s, low yields and the absence of 
collective marketing obliged small farmers to sell fresh ginger to local traders. The 
farmers lacked market information and their exposure to opportunistic behaviour 
grew as the project increased both the size and frequency of their transactions in this 
informal market. In 2004, the project established the Bhairab Ginger Producers’ 
Cooperative (a marketing cooperative) and linked it to a district-level federal 
cooperative. The federal cooperative aggregated the output of several producer 
cooperatives and negotiated a relational contract with a large wholesaler attracted by 
the sizeable crop and low unit transaction costs. The relational contract required the 
buyer to make payments in advance of delivery. This shifted risk from growers to the 
buyer, suggesting that collective marketing via cooperatives afforded the growers 
more bargaining power. Repeat transactions and ex post price renegotiation when 
prices were bullish provided some internal enforcement measures to encourage 
contract compliance in this dyad.  
 
However, inadequate internal enforcement, high costs of collective action (that were 
not financially viable without project support) and high levels of environmental risk 
(caused by frequent policy changes affecting the importation of fresh ginger into 
India) led to the demise of this dyad after just three years. The producer cooperative 
resorted to trading its (smaller) volumes directly with wholesalers. In addition, grant 
funding enabled the cooperative to purchase driers and to negotiate a relational 
contract with Exporter 1 to sell sliced dry ginger. This relational contract was driven 
by the complexity of transactions as the importers specified stringent quality, volume 
and schedule requirements. Asset specific investment in organic certification by 
Exporter 1 also encouraged relational contracting. This dyad certainly offered 
growers a more stable pricing regime than did the volatile fresh ginger market. 
 
Despite its advantages, the dry ginger dyad also collapsed after three years. Its failure 
was prompted by inconsistent quality due to poor sanitation and inappropriate 
drying, and to inconsistent volume and delivery. These environmental risks were 
attributed to under-investment in value-adding equipment as the driers were too 
small to maintain a regular supply of quality product. In addition, bullish prices in 
the fresh ginger market encouraged opportunistic behaviour on the part of producers 
who shifted their deliveries to wholesale traders in the fresh market, thus exposing 
the buyer (Exporter 1) to a hold-up problem. The producer cooperative sacrificed the 
long-term benefits of relational contracting in the dried ginger market for short-term 
gains in the informal fresh ginger market. This behaviour may also explain why the 
producer cooperative was not enthusiastic about supplying Exporter 2. 
  
Producer opportunism during periods of rising prices and under-investment in value-
adding assets are predictable problems in traditional marketing cooperatives as their 
institutional arrangements encourage members to maximise profits in the short-term 
and to avoid investments that yield superior returns in the long-term (Cook, 1995; 
Harris et al., 1996). Nepal’s ginger cooperatives were established along traditional 
lines and are therefore prone to the ‘horizon’ problem described by Cook (1995). The 
flawed institutional arrangements of these cooperatives appear to have contributed to 
the demise of relational contracts and loss of robustness in the ginger chain as the 
only investment made by the Bhairab Ginger Producers’ Cooperative was financed 
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from external grants and the evidence points strongly to opportunism by the 
cooperative during periods of rising prices.  
 
When opportunism and under-investment collapsed the relational contracting dyads, 
the producer cooperative was left with no choice but to trade informally with 
wholesalers. Spot markets do not exist as there are no grades and standards to 
differentiate produce - fresh ginger is traded in Nepal without even removing soil 
from the rhizome. The behavioural and environmental risk that undermined relational 
contracts also constrained conventional contracting in the absence of cost-effective 
external enforcement. Collective marketing and the low complexity of transactions in 
the informal market help to keep transaction costs low even though the frequency of 
transactions is high.  
  
Large cardamom 
 
All three of the dyads observed in the cardamom chain were characterised by the 
attributes of an informal market where product standards and trading rules are poorly 
specified, goods are traded for cash, and transactions are independent of previous or 
subsequent transactions. There was little evidence of a spot market, conventional 
contracting or relational contracting. Prior to the advent of mobile telephones, 
however, the cardamom chain was dominated by Dahadani - a dyad omitted from the 
conceptual model. Although Dahadani represented a form of relational contracting, 
the evidence suggested that the relationship was built on asymmetric information and 
was not fair to farmers. Figure 5 illustrates observed dyads in the cardamom chain. 
 
 
Figure 5: Observed and failed modes of engagement and their drivers  
 
Dahadani appears to be a beneficial relational contract for farmers as it gave them 
access to finance and an assured market. However, farmers perceived the interest 
charges and prices offered by buyers to be unfair, and were obliged to commit a part 
of their next crop to redeem loans if their current crop fell short of expectations. 
Buyers, it seems, had an information advantage. The attributes of the Dahadani 
system suggest that this type of relationship can be best described as a captive 
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relational contract. However, such a captive relationship was not driven by mutual 
interdependence or by efforts to jointly create value, but by a combination of 
asymmetric information and the absence of alternative sources of credit. Expansion 
of mobile phone technology reduced the cost of information as farmers could easily 
ask alternative local buyers for prices. In addition, alternative sources of credit 
emerged and farmers were no longer dependent on finance from traders. As a result, 
the captive Dahadani system collapsed. 
 
When this happened, farmers switched to informal market trading that offered them 
better terms. A true relational contract did not develop due to the absence of asset 
specific investment amongst buyers, and high environmental risk in production due 
to crop diseases and price volatility caused by shifts in production and demand in 
India (and possibly in other countries). Production and price uncertainty also make it 
harder to anticipate contingencies and therefore raise the cost of both relational and 
conventional contracting. 
 
While mobile phone technology alleviated the problem of asymmetric price 
information in the farmer-buyer dyad, farmers and supporting agencies claimed that 
prices were not competitive as their buyers supply a small number of exporters who 
control the links to Indian markets. In their view, these exporters are large, well 
informed and collude to keep new entrants out of the market. Buyers, on the other 
hand, claimed that their prices reflected supply and demand in Indian markets.  
 
Perceptions of asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour by exporters 
would tend to discourage farmers from making value-adding investments. If farmers 
under-invest because they perceive a problem of asymmetric information, then 
potential solutions are to disseminate credible market information and to strengthen 
farmers’ bargaining power through collective marketing. On the other hand, if 
farmers under-invest because the premiums for value-adding are genuinely too low, 
then a potential solution is to reduce the unit costs of value-adding and of engaging 
in more complex transactions by pooling their produce and marketing it collectively 
(the ginger chain highlighted the role that producer cooperatives could play in value 
adding and attracting preferred buyers). In either case, collective marketing could 
play an important role in developing contractual relationships between producers and 
buyers further down the chain. Higher levels of investment would, however, also 
require that producer marketing cooperatives be structured in ways that encourage 
investment by farmers and, perhaps, by strategic partners.  
 
Lack of confidence in the prices offered by exporters may also have contributed to 
the absence of well-defined grades and standards (as they would be of little value) 
and, consequently, to the absence of spot markets. Following the welcome demise of 
captive relational contracts, cardamom farmers in Ilam were left with informal 
trading as their only marketing channel.  
 
Conceptual model revisited 
 
The cardamom case study revealed a dyadic relationship omitted from the conceptual 
model illustrated in Figure 1, Dahadani – a  ‘captive’ form of relational contracting. 
This mode of engagement was associated with buyer opportunism to take advantage 
of asymmetric information and the absence of anternative sources of credit. The 
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captive relational contract observed in the cardamom chain differs from the captive 
supply contract described by Gereffi et al. (2005) which was aimed at adding value 
by strenghtening the capacity of small farmers to meet rigourous product 
specifications. In the case of Dahadani, the captive relationship fits the lower end of 
the vertical coordination continuum as the risk-reward profile of informal market 
transactions was preferred to that of Dahadani. Figure 6 offers a revised version of 
the conceptual model.  
 
Figure 6: Revised conceptual model 
 
CROSS-CASE COMPARISON 
 
Figure 7 compares observed and failed dyads in the ginger and cardamom chains 
with the revised conceptual model. At the time of the study, the informal market was 
the only dyad available to smallholders in either chain, yet the pathways leading to 
this outcome were quite different in each chain. This section focuses on exogenous 
chain attributes (Table 3) that could have contributed to this outcome through their 
effects on transaction costs.  
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Figure 7: Revised conceptual model vs. observed and 
failed modes of transaction 
Table 3:  Exogenous attributes of observed farmer-buyer dyads  
Attributes Large cardamom Ginger 
Attributes that differ between chains
Collective marketing  No Yes 
Product traded Dried capsules Fresh rhizome  
Crop biology Perennial with a long gestation period Annual 
Bulkiness Low  High  
Storability Long Short 
Attributes that are similar between chains 
Harvest season Single per year Single per year 
Export vs. domestic Export Primarily export 
Alternative local buyers Many Many 
Alternative suppliers Many Many 
Intermediaries in the 
supply chain Many  Many 
Product uses  Consumption and Industrial  Consumption and industrial 
Product differentiation None None 
Compliance requirement None None  
Access to finance Self-help groups/Micro-finance institutions Cooperatives 
Mobile telephone  Now available Now available 
Road access 
All-weather road connected 
nearby market centre but not 
farms 
All-weather road connected 
nearby market centre but not 
farms 
Research and extension 
advice 
Available from government 
extension agency (perceived 
as weak)  
Available through cooperative  
and government agency  
Legal system Unavailable or costly Unavailable or costly 
Rules and standards 
enforced by third party Absent Absent 
Informal market
No- transaction
Failed captive 
relational 
contract
No-
transaction
Informal 
market
Spot 
market Conventional 
contracting
Relational 
contracting
Vertical 
integration
‘Captive’
relational 
contracting
No-
transactionNo- transaction
Failed relational 
contracts
Informal 
market
A. Conceptual 
model
B. Large 
cardamom
C. Ginger
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Table 3 shows that the exogenous attributes characterising the cardamom and ginger chains 
are similar with the exception of collective action, crop biology, bulkiness, storability and the 
nature of the product traded. Despite these differences, both chains depend entirely on 
informal trading. This suggests that differences in crop attributes (gestation period, bulkiness, 
storability and the nature of the product) and collective marketing were not large enough to 
distinguish the dyadic relationships in these chains, or that other factors overwhelmed the 
impact of these factors. Jaffee (1995) did not find any consistent effect of product attributes 
on modes of smallholder engagement observed in his study of horticultural export chains in 
Kenya. 
 
At first glance, the unimportance of collective marketing is surprising as cooperation is 
expected to reduce unit transaction costs and to facilitate joint investment in value-adding 
assets. However, collective marketing failed to create new dyads in the ginger chain (despite 
increasing the volumes and frequency of transactions) as the producers’ cooperative adopted 
traditional institutional arrangements that inhibited investment. Under-investment in dryer 
capacity and a temporary increase in the price of fresh ginger discouraged the cooperative 
from maintaining its relational contract with an exporter of dried ginger slices. In the 
cardamom chain, the absence of collective marketing not only precluded farmer investment 
in value-adding assets but also denied farmers the opportunity to bulk up supplies, reduce 
unit transaction costs and attract a preferred buyer.  
 
Cardamom’s long gestation increases the level of asset specific investment made by farmers 
who grow the crop on land suited to annual crops. However, cardamom is easy to store, 
allowing farmers to wait for favourable prices and so reduce their risk of hold-up. Ultimately, 
differences in crop biology, bulkiness and storability between cardamom and ginger did not 
alter the way producers and buyers engage in these supply chains.   
 
Both chains are long, primarily serving Indian markets and involving many intermediaries. 
Collective marketing and mobile telephone services alleviated the problem of asymmetric 
information in the farmer-buyer dyads of the ginger and cardamom chains respectively. 
However, farmers suspected that prices offered by exporters were not market related. Indeed, 
the absence of well-defined grades and standards does suggest a general lack of credible 
information about the downstream export market. 
  
Road access and the availability of extension services were similar in the ginger and 
cardamom chains. Better access to roads should reduce transport costs for both producers and 
buyers. Likewise, research, development and extension should improve yields and quality. 
However, such improvements are unlikely to create new marketing channels for smallholders 
while there is a perception of asymmetric information and under-investment in value-adding 
assets. Better access to an effective legal system may also do little to encourage conventional 
contracting while yields and export markets are so uncertain. Research, extension and market 
information are first required to reduce environmental risk. 
 
In sum, it appears that the lack of variation in dyadic relationships between smallholders and 
their immediate buyers in the ginger and cardamom chains can be attributed fundamentally to 
the similarity of their markets and enabling environments, asymmetric information and a poor 
choice of cooperative model to facilitate collective investment in value-adding assets and 
processes. 
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Nepal is well positioned to access international cardamom markets (ITC, 2007) and to earn 
higher prices for its ginger (FAO, undated) but needs to add value to its products. Although 
the chains described in this paper continue to engage smallholders, they provide little if any 
choice – a situation analogous to the low-level equilibrium described by Dorward et al. 
(2003) and Poulton et al. (2006). Improving the flow of information along chains serving 
Indian markets and complementing this information with well-defined grades and standards 
could promote local spot markets, but a substantive improvement in the performance of these 
chains from a smallholder perspective will require investment in value-adding assets and 
activities. This, in turn, will require collective marketing. It is unfortunate that Nepal adopted 
a traditional cooperative model to promote collective marketing as traditional cooperatives do 
not generate strong incentives for investment (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). Instead, they create 
incentives for producers to take advantage of high prices in spot and informal markets at the 
expense of relational contracts with long-term benefits. This was evident in the case study of 
the ginger chain, and similar findings are reported by Beverland (2007) in his comparison of 
traditional and New Generation Cooperatives in New Zealand. Such an outcome is entirely 
inconsistent with the notion of value adding, especially when contracts are complex and 
external enforcement via the legal system is not a viable alternative to internal enforcement.  
  
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The case studies of the cardamom and ginger chains showed that these chains had been 
unable to sustain smallholder engagement in dyads other than the informal market. These 
chains are, therefore, not robust from the perspective of smallholders as the absence of 
multiple marketing channels constrains their marketing choices. The case studies suggest that 
other modes of engagement are unlikely to develop while farmers perceive that prices are 
manipulated by exporters. Under these conditions, farmers see little point in adding-value or 
establishing and complying with grades and standards. Improving the flow of information 
along the export chain may at least help to establish sustainable spot markets. However, 
value-adding requires collective marketing to spread processing, marketing and transaction 
costs. Evidence from the ginger chain showed that collective marketing can indeed give 
smallholders access to preferred marketing channels, but it also showed that the traditional 
cooperative model is unlikely to sustain dyadic relationships for value-added products 
because it discourages member investment and undermines compliance with relational 
contracts. The government should consider supporting hybrid cooperative models like New 
Generation Cooperatives and investor-share cooperatives to promote collective marketing 
amongst smallholders. The case studies also highlighted the importance of research, 
extension and information to reduce high levels of yield risk that constrain both conventional 
and relational contracting. 
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